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Of Kant’s Epistemology
As a well-known common sense, Kant’s philosophy has an extensive, strong and far-reaching impact on various academic fields, and it directly influences many liberal arts fields like philosophy, politics, aesthetics, ethics and legal philosophy, and also has a fair degree of indirect influence on scientific fields like mathematics and physics. Therefore, it is a valuable thing to do some investigations about Kant’s philosophy, but considering that the range of Kant’s philosophy is very broad, thus, in this paper, we will restrict in investigating certain questions in its epistemology, and temporarily not considering its other aspects, like political philosophy, ethics and aesthetics. Since the publication of the first edition ofCritique of Pure Reasonin 1781, during the over 200 years to date, due to the broadness, profundity, systematicness and originality of Kant’s epistemology, it has caused many scholars’ attention in various fields, and we can say that its related expositions are already very rich and complex, and in this paper, we want to do some analyses and summarizations about Kant’s own thoughts and other scholars’ existing research and make some new explorations.
(I)Some Basic Problems in Kant’sEpistemology
Obviously, the range of Kant’s epistemology is broad, and it also has quite depth, though it mainly embodies in the workCritique of Pure Reason,but some earlier papers, such as “Thoughts on the True Estimation of the Living Forces” (1749), “A New Doctrine of Motion and Rest” (1758), “Attempt to Introduce of Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy” (1763), etc, and books likeGeneral Natural History and Theory of the Heavens(1755), also include many valuable epistemological views. As an important link of the development of Kant’s epistemological thought, in these early works, Kant is continuously extending, deepening and integrating his ideas, and meanwhile, we can also easily see, these early works involve many natural sciences like physics, mathematics and geology, which also shows that Kant has an extensive and delicate attainment in natural sciences field (certainly, it should be noted that, though Kant’s attainment in physics and mathematics is broad, it cannot be said to be deep, and his understandings about Newtonian mechanics and calculus are all literary, not symbolic, which is undoubtedly a significant feature of Kant’s natural science knowledge, below we will continue to discuss this issue), and as we know, natural sciences make up an important background of Kant’s epistemology. However, though these early works also has considerable importance, after all, the ideas of the mature period of Kant’s epistemology mainly embodies in the bookCritique of Pure Reason, thus in this article, our discussions still use it as the main body.
BecauseCritique of Pure Reasonis always famous for its obscurity, difficulty and abstraction, and therefore, many people are in fear of it, in fact, this book’s holistic connotation is somewhat clear, about this, we firstly need to figure out its holistic framework, and figuring out this book’s external form is very helpful to understand its substance. Broadly speaking, though this classic’s holistic design has some flaws, on the whole is still somewhat systematic and clear, and it is divided into “Transcendental doctrine of Elements” (it is the major part) and “Transcendental doctrine of Method” these two main parts, while “Transcendental doctrine of Elements” is divided into “Transcendental Aesthetic” (mainly discusses space and time) and “Transcendental Logic” (it is the major part, which investigates important essential problems, such as “the deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding”, “principle of pure understanding”, “the antimony of pure reason”, etc) these two different parts. Generally speaking, though this work often has repetitive, contradictory and ambiguous places, the division of the above different parts is still somewhat clear, while Kant’s expositions in the corresponding chapters also largely center around certain important themes.
About Kant’s epistemology, different scholars will have different expounding methods, and in this part, we prepare to select certain central themes in Kant’s epistemology to make some deep explorations; meanwhile, since Kant’s epistemology is rooted in the whole of western philosophy, and therefore, here, we do not want to discuss about Kant’s epistemology in isolation, instead, we want to put it into the context of western philosophy to investigate it.
1 Empiricism and Rationalism, Sensibility and Understanding.As is well known, one important theme of Kant’s epistemology is to compromise the contradiction between empiricism and rationalism. Before Kant, about the source of knowledge and human’s cognitive means, empiricists like Aristotle, Locke and Hume and rationalists like Plato, Descartes and Leibniz all stick to their own argument, while in Kant’s view, pure empiricism and pure rationalism actually both cannot solve problems like the source of knowledge, and he thinks the source ofknowledge comes from the unity of sensible materials and understanding concepts, and he writes: “That in the appearance which corresponds to sensation I term itmatter, but that which so determines the manifold of appearance that allows of being ordered in certain relations, I term theformof appearance.” “Objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields usintuitions; they are thought through the understanding, and from the understanding arisesconcepts.”[1]In summary, Kant thinks only the combination of sensibility and understanding can produce knowledge, which is one of the central arguments of Kant’s epistemology, and in the “transcendental aesthetic” and “transcendental logic” parts, Kant repeatedly argues and elaborates this basic view, and about issues like time and space and the pure concepts of the understanding, the relationship between sensibility and understanding is an important analytic dimension, which also constitutes a basic theme of Kant’s epistemology.
Certainly, as we know, in the history of western philosophy, the debate between empiricism and rationalism actually already exists in the ancient Greece, and about it, we can quote Schrodinger’s one passage: “Parmenides, who flourished in Elea, Italy, around 480 B. C. (which is roughly a decade before Socrates was born in Athens, and a little more than a decade before the birth of Democritus in Abdera, is one of the first to develop an extremely anti-sensual, aprioristically conceived view of the world…In truth there were not many things in the world but only One Thing. And this thing is (I beg your pardon) the thing thatis, in contradistinction to the thing that is not.”[2]“As an outstanding example of pure sensualism we adduce the great sophist Protagoras…Protagoras regarded the sense perception as the only things that really existed, the only material from which our world-picture is made up. In principle all of them have to pass for equally true, even when modified or distorted by fever, disease, intoxication or madness.”[3]In a word, in ancient Greece, Parmenides and Protagoras already formed the overall view of empiricism and rationalism; while in the modern period of 20thcentury, scientists like Eddington still value this basic fact, and as Schrodinger says: “Eddington’s claim that some ostensibly purely empirical constants can be inferred from pure reason, for instance, the total number of elementary particles in the universe.”[4]Namely, the relationship between experience and reason is an important theme of Kant’s philosophy and is also an important theme of western philosophy, but compared with Kant in the 18thcentury, how much new knowledge and new understanding do people like Schrodinger and Eddington in the 20thcentury add to this problem? Perhaps not much, and moreover, it even has a certain degree of retrogression, because Kant’s discussions about the relationship between sensibility and understanding, experience and reason are more complex and profound than Schrodinger, etc.
About this theme of Kant’s epistemology, well-known philosopher Popper also makes some expositions, and he writes: “It is not these sense-data but our own intellect, the organization of the digestive system of our mind, which is responsible for our theories. Nature as we know it, with its order and with its laws, is thus largely a product of the assimilating and ordering activities of our mind.” “Even those who, like myself, cannot follow Kant all the way can accept his (Eddington) view that the experimenter must not wait till it pleases nature to reveal her secrets, but that he must question her. He must cross-examine nature in the light of his doubts, his conjectures, his theories, his ideas and his inspirations.”[5]We can easily see, here Popper is almost repeating Kant’s views, but he more values the understanding and concept side in Kant’s epistemology, and is less concerned with the sensibility and experience side; if we carefully read Popper’s expositions about Kant’s philosophy in the seventh chapter “Kant’s Critique and Cosmology” ofConjectures and Refutations, we will find, Popper’s mastery of Kant’s epistemology is unilateral, and he probably just knows some parts like space-time view and the relationship between sensibility and understanding, and does not know other important parts like “the original synthetic unity of apperception” and “the pure concepts of the understanding”, etc, and moreover, even about problems like time-space view, the relationship between sensibility and understanding, Popper’s understanding is also more coarse and superficial than Kant. Namely, from the 18thcentury to the 20thcentury, about many problems discussed in Kant’s epistemology, many scholars’ view in the philosophical world not only do not make much progress, but have a certain degree of retrogression, and moreover, this phenomenon not only happens in Kant’s epistemology, but also happens in other important philosophers’ epistemology like Locke and Leibniz, and I think it is a phenomenon worth our attention.
About Kant’s basic division between sensibility and understanding, we can also refer to Wittgenstein’s one view, and he writes: “What is the relationship between name and the thing named?-Well, what is it? Look at language-game (2) or at another one: there you can see the sort of thing this relation consists in. This relation may also consist, among many other things, in the fact that hearing the name calls before our mind the picture of what is named; and it also consists, among other things, in the name’s being written on the thing named or being pronounced when that thing is pointed out.”[6]Namely, Wittgenstein thinks there is a one-to-one mapping between the name and real thing, which also has great similarity with Kant’s view that concepts of understanding are active generalizations of sensible things, and it’s just that Wittgenstein treats this problem within the framework of language philosophy, while Kant treats this problem within the framework of epistemology, and generally speaking, Wittgenstein’s these investigations also include quite a few new ideas. To conclude, from the example of Kant and Wittgenstein here, we can also see some basic problem consciousness of modern philosophy and some internal continuity and development trends of western philosophy.
Meanwhile, we also should point out another important fact, namely, the basic view of empiricism and rationalism not only extensively exists in western philosophy, in fact, it commonly exists in various countries’ social and cultural traditions, and it’s just that the writing ways and degree of systematization are somewhat different, for example, the ancient Chinese thinker Chu Hsi once wrote: “Ask: ‘Can we say that before there are heaven and earth, there is already reason?’ Reply: ‘Before there are heaven and earth, what exists is just reason. If there is reason, there are heaven and eath, if there is no reason, there are no heaven and earth, no people and object, and there is nothing. If there is reason, there will be qi, which fosters everything.’ ‘Ask: ‘Is fostering given by reason?’ ‘Reply: ‘If there is reason, there will be qi prevalent. Reason has no shape.’”[7]What Chu His expresses in this passage is naturally rationalism view, and this view actually has little difference with Plato, Leibniz and etc, to conclude, in ancient Chinese culture, there are actually also discussions about the complex relationship between reason and experience, and there are naturally also many similar situations in other cultural traditions. The emergence of this phenomenon is naturally not accidental, because the intricate relationship between experience and reason is indeed a basic problem in human society and thought, and it will naturally emerge in various societies, merely that Kant and others’ related elaborations are more systematic and deep.
2 Space and Time.The space and time problem also makes up an important theme of Kant’s epistemology (meanwhile, it is also a basic theme of western philosophy, and philosophers like Reichenbach are all concerned with this problem), and Kant does systematic and complex investigations about their intension, and in Transcendental Aesthetic, his expositions about them are both divided into some points of metaphysical expositions and transcendental expositions these two parts; firstly, about the nature of space, he writes: “Space is nothing but the form of all appearance of outer space. It is the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is possible for us.” “We assert, then, the empirical reality of space, as regards all possible outer experience, and yet at the same time we assert its transcendental ideality-in other words, that it is nothing at all, immediately we withdraw the above condition, namely, its limitation to possible experience, and so look upon it as something that underlies things in themselves.”[8]While about the nature of time, he says: “Time is nothing but the form of inner sense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state. It cannot be a determination of outer appearances; it has to do neither with shape nor position, but with the relation of representations in our inner state.” “Time is the formala prioricondition of all appearances whatsoever. Space, as the pure form of all outer intuition, is so far limited; it serves as the a priori condition only of outer appearances.”[9]To sum up, Kant thinks there are certain differences between the nature of space and time, and the former one is the form of outer sense, while the latter one is the form of inner sense, and meanwhile, they both have close connections with empirical things and are also general forms in conceptual level, namely, they both include empirical components and also have pure form characteristics, and are unification of them. In brief, Kant thinks space and time both have complex intensions and are unification of experience and pure form, while they together constitute the foundation of mathematics. Kant’s related expositions about space and time are somewhat complex and deep, here we just select some limited aspects, and interested readers can refer to the relevant chapters of Critique of Pure Reason, and meanwhile, Kant’s many deep insights about this theme also have wide ranging and profound impacts in the subsequent philosophical and scientific world.
About the space and time problem in Kant’s epistemology, Popper also makes some expositions, and he writes: “But space and time themselves are neither things nor events; they cannot even be observed; they are more elusive. They are a kind of framework for things and events; something like a system of pigeon-holes, or a filing system, for observations. Space and time are not part of the real empirical world of things and events, but rather part of our mental outfit, our apparatus for grasping this world. Their proper use is as instruments of observation; in observing any event we locate it, as a rule, immediately and intuitively in an order of space and time. Thus space and time may be described as a frame of reference which is not based upon experience but intuitively used in experience, and properly applicable to experience.”[10]Popper’s these views are roughly similar to Kant, but we can also easily see, Kant’s relevant perceptions are more systematic and profound than Popper, namely, about this important epistemological problem, the views of many scholars in the 20th-century philosophical world also have a certain degree of retrogression.
Kant’s investigations about space and time are quite interesting, but, compared with them, modern mathematics and physics’ explorations about space and time are obviously much more systematic and deep; here, we want to give two appropriate examples. The first example is special relativity which philosophers often like talking about, as is well known, 20th-century philosophers very like talking about special relativity’s so-called philosophical meaning and arguing its so-called philosophical intension about time and space; but when physicists such as Lorentz and Einstein create special relativity, what they mainly consider is its physical meaning, and the philosophical speculations merely play an auxiliary role. Take the Lorentz transformation in it as example, when building this basic formula, what Lorentz mainly considers are physical problems such as the quantitative relationship between reference system, the propagation of optical signal and time transformation, etc, and through complex mathematical deductions and computations, then deducing the Lorentz transformation, and this deduction process is somewhat complicated, and philosophers without sufficient mathematical and physical training are impossible to get this important quantitative formula. Take the mass-energy equation in it as another example, Einstein also mainly considers physical problems such as the work of force, energy, mass increase, etc, and then deduces this important formula, and it also uses tools such as differential calculus and integral calculus, while if we just have philosophers’ these hollow philosophical discussions, then we cannot get this basic physical conclusion at all. In general, I think many 20th-century philosophers actually do not really understand the complex symbolic deductions in special relativity, and their mastery of special relativity’s concrete contents are all somewhat coarse, superficial and vague, and mostly stay at the literary level.
The second example is the study of modern geometry, and modern geometry’s study certainly greatly broadens and deepens our understanding about space problem, here, we want to quote several passages of the great mathematician Poincare as illustration, and he writes: “In our mind the latent idea of a certain number of group pre-existed; these are the groups with which Lie’s theory is concerned. Which shall we choose to form a kind of standard by which to compare natural phenomena? And when this group is chosen, which of the sub-groups shall we take to characterize a point in space? Experiement has guided us by showing us what choice adapts itself best to the properties of our body; but there its role ends.”[11]Namely, in the modern geometric study, group theory plays an important role, while group theory is a complex theoretical system, which are made up of many concepts and methods such as group homomorphism, group product, group action, normal subgroup, commutator subgroup, normalizer, etc, while most philosophers just have a vague impression about group theory, without many concrete and systematic understandings at all, while if one people do not know these knowledge about group theory, he probably cannot understand many modern geometric ideas. At another place, Poincare says: “Geometers normally make a distinction between two kinds of geometry, and they call the first type as metric geometry and the second type as projective geometry. Metric geometry is based on the concept of distance, and in metric geometry, when two graphs are ‘congruent’(in the sense mathematicians give it meaning), they are considered as equivalent. Projective geometry is basedon the concept of straight line. Because in projective geometry,we think two graphs are equivalent do not require they are equal, and just they can correspond through projective transformations (namely, one is the projection of the other) is enough. The second type of geometry is often calledqualitative geometry, and if compared with the first type of geometry, it is indeed so. Obviously, in projective geometry, metric and quantity do not play an essetial role.”[12]Namely, in modern geometric study, metric geometry (Euclidean geometry) and projective geometry are both important branches of geometry, and take projective geometry as example, with the joint efforts of several generations of mathematicians (such as Ponchelet, Steiner, Mobius, etc) in the 18thand 19thcentury, projective geometry already has rich details and forms complete and systematic theoretical framework, and these two types of geometry both have systematic and deep study about basic problems like geometric property and spatial structure, and both use many varied symbols; we think this kind of geometric study really increases human’s concrete knowledge about space, while the so-called philosophical speculations do not have too much meaning. My personal view is, most philosophers do not quite know metric geometry and projective geometry’s concrete and complex contents, and just have some vague impressions, but if one people are not familiar with these modern geometries, he probably are not very qualified to talk about problems like the nature of space.
In brief, we think modern mathematics and physics really increase people’s understandings about time and space, and the so-called philosophical investigations are actually of limited meaning. Because many philosophers’ speculations have two basic defects: firstly, these philosophical speculations are often superficial and vague, not systematic and symbolic deductions but are just literary; secondly, these philosophical discussions are also often repetitive, in fact, they do not have much change in fundamental views and merely have some changes of details. In conclusion, about many discussions about space and time of Kant (and the philosophical world), we need to hold a dialectical attitude.
3 How are a priori Synthetic Judgments Possible.A priori synthetic judgment problem is also a basic problem in Kant’s epistemology, broadly speaking, Kant thinks mathematics and natural sciences are both synthetic judgments, and are also both a priori judgments, and about it, he writes: “1All mathematical judgments, without exception, are synthetic”, “mathematical propositions, strictly so called, are always judgments a priori, not empirical; because they carry with them necessity, which cannot be derived from experience.” “2Natural science (physics) contains a priori synthetic judgments as principles. I need cite only two such judgments: that in all changes or the material world the quantity of matter remains unchanged; and that in all communication of motion, action and reaction must always be equal.” Considering these basic properties of mathematics and physics, Kant thinks one important problem in epistemology is to examine the reason why a priori synthetic propositions (such as mathematical and natural science propositions) have universal necessity, and he thinks: “An organon of pure reason would be the sum-total of those principles according to which all modes of pure a priori knowledge can be acquired and actually brought into being.”[13]To conclude, the first Critique largely revolves around this problem; as we know, Kant thinks the universal necessity of mathematical propositions comes from space and time as form of sensible intuition (Transcendental Aesthetic), while the universal necessity of natural science propositions comes from the category in the understanding field and the “self-consciousness” of “transcendental apperception” (Transcendental Analytic).
About the synthetic judgment in Kant’s epistemology, modern philosopher Rorty also makes some expositions; Kant once wrote: “Time and space, taken together, are the pure forms of all sensible intuition, and so are what makea priorisynthetic propositions possible.”[14]While Rorty also says: “But how, if we have not read Locke and Hume, do we know that the mind is presented with a diversity? Why should we think that sensibility ‘in its original receptivity’ presents us with a manifold, a manifold which, however, ‘cannot be represented as a manifold’ until the understanding has used concepts to synthesize it? We cannot introspect and see that it does, because we are never conscious of unsynthesized intuitions, nor of concepts apart from their application to intuitions.”[15]Namely, Rorty also values the importance of synthetic judgments, and he also thinks through synthetic judgments, concepts unify many disorderly intuitive appearances, and thus making human cognition possible.
About the problem of how a priori synthetic judgments are possible Kant raises, namely, the reason why mathematical propositions and natural science propositions have universal necessity, I think Kant’s these complex epistemological discussions probably have certain value, but the views of scientists who are practically engaged in scientific research are more powerful, and as famous mathematician Weyl says: “The axiomatic method consists simply in making a complete collection of the basic concepts as well as the basic facts from which all concepts and theorems of a science can be derived by definition and deduction respectively. If this is possible, then the scientific theory in question is said to bedefiniteaccording to Husserl.” Namely, Weyl thinks, a big part of modern mathematics is based on axiomatic definition (for example, the definition of group in group theory needs to satisfy associativity, identity and inverse element these three conditions, and on the basis of axiomatic definition of group we build group theory’s whole theoretical system, and ring theory’s situation is also similar), and based on several simple axioms, mathematicians construct the whole system through strict logical reasoning, and therefore, they certainly have universal effectiveness. Weyl further explains: “For the purpose of an absolute proof o consistency we have none but thedirectmethod at our disposal, which endeavors to show that by following the rules of deductive inference one will never arrive at two propositions of which one is the negation of the other. Complete enumeration of the logical rules of the game is here a necessary presupposition; for only then can one apply the method to propositions, blind against their meaning, as one applies the rules of chess to chessmen.”[16]Namely, all the mathematical axiomatic systems need to ensure the propositions’ consistency, and cannot have any hole in logic, and this kind of mathematical system with strict consistency certainly has universal correctness. To conclude, about the effective issue of the so-called a priori synthetic propositions, Kant’s many epistemological views probably have certain value and rationality, but I think it is not decisive, and the decisive aspect should consider the basic characteristics and contents of modern sciences like mathematics and physics (such as the rigorous logicality, axiomatization in mathematics, and experiment’s function to test theory, experimental physics as physics’ empirical foundation in physics).
4 The Pure Concepts of the Understanding, Categories.In “Transcendental Aesthetic” part, Kant proves the universal necessity of mathematical propositions by elaborating that time and space are forms of sensible intuition, while in “Transcendental Analytic” part, Kant sets the proof of the universal necessity of natural science propositions as his goal, and for it, he thinks the reason why natural science propositions are universally true is derived from the universality of understanding concepts, namely, understanding concepts can unify multiple sensible facts. While in human’s understanding ability, the pure concepts of the understanding is the core, and about it, he writes: “The same function which gives unity to the various representations in ajudgmentalso gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in anintuition; and this unity, in its most general forms, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding. The same understanding, through the same operations by which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a judgment, also introduces a transcendental content into its representations, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general. On this account we are entitled to call these representations pure concepts of the understanding, and to regard them as applyinga priorito objects-a conclusion which general logic is not in a position to establish.” The meaning of Kant’s this passage is relatively clear, namely, in empirical field, the physical, chemical and biological facts are jumbled, but the pure concepts of understanding human has are transcendental, which can thereby give universal applicability to these multiple representations. In the whole book of “analytic of concepts” in transcendental analytic, Kant is repeatedly proving this basic argument, and after many complicated discussions, Kant concludes: “The transcendental deduction of alla prioriconcepts has thus a principle according to which the whole enquiry must be directed, namely, that they must be recognized asa prioriconditions of the possibility of experience, alike of the intuition which is to be met with in it and of the thought.” Namely, Kant thinks, the pure concepts of the understanding is human’s one kind of transcendental ability, and it ensures the universal effectiveness of natural science, and this overall view also accords with Kant’s basic position of transcendental idealism.
But the pure concepts of the understanding is just an abstract general thing, and as its concrete composition, Kant propounds the well-known twelve categories, namely: “1 Of Quantity, Unity, Plurality, Totality, 2 Of Quality, Reality, Negation, Limitation, 3 Of Relation, Of Inherence and Subsistence, Of Causality and Dependence, Of Community, 4 Of Modality, Possibility-Impossibility, Existence-Non-Existence, Necessity-Contingency.” Kant thinks, these twelve categories are the embodiment of pure concepts of the understanding, and they ensure the universal necessity of natural science propositions, and he writes: “This then is the list of all original pure concepts of synthesis that the understanding contains within itself a priori. Indeed, it is because it contains these concepts that it is called pure understanding; for by them alone can it understand anything in the manifold of intuition, that is, think an object of intuition.” “The categories, above cited, are nothing but the conditions of thought in a possible experience, just as space and time are the conditions of intuition for that same experience.” In the meantime, Kant thinks, though these twelve categories are some most important categories, they are still relatively general, and thereby, there are many more concrete understanding concepts subordinate to them, “the categories, as the true primary concepts of the pure understanding, have also their pure derivative concepts”, “I beg permission to entitle these pure but derivative concepts of the understanding thepredicablesof the pure understanding”, and as an example of these derivative concepts, Kant writes: “for instance, by placing under the category of causality the predicables of force, action, passion.”[17]To conclude, Kant thinks twelve categories are the concretization of pure concepts of the understanding, while these twelve categories all have rich, concrete intension (such as Of Inherence and Subsistence, Of Causality and Dependence, Of Community these three core categories), and Kant also makes somewhat detailed and deep expositions about their implications, and therefore, twelve categories are important components of Kant’s epistemology. As we know, Kant’s twelve categories have a far-reaching and complex impact in physics, philosophy and etc, and many brilliant scientists and philosophers have profoundly discussed these problems.
5 Self-Consciousness, The Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception.As stated above, in order to investigate cognitive origins in understanding field, Kant introduces ingredients such as the pure concepts of the understanding and twelve categories, etc; but Kant thinks only using the pure concepts of the understanding and twelve categories to prove the universal effectiveness of natural science knowledge and human perception is not enough, and we must make deeper explorations and need to attribute many understanding concepts to “self-consciousness” and “the original synthetic unity of apperception” these two more essential things. About the intension of “self-consciousness”, Kant writes: “It must be possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my representations”, “all my representations in any given intuition must be subject to that condition under which alone I can ascribe them to the identical self as my representations, and so can comprehend them as synthetically combined in one apperception through the general form, ‘I think’”. “The abiding and unchanging ‘I’ (pure apperception) forms the correlated of all our representations in so far as it is to be at all possible that we should become conscious of them. All consciousness as truly belongs to an all-comprehensive pure apperception.” Namely, Kant thinks, “I think” integrates people’s messy intuitions, which also constantly exists in people’s consciousness, and thus, it ensures knowledge objective effectiveness in human perceptual domain.
While about “the original synthetic unity of apperception”, Kant writes: “The supreme principle of the same possibility, in its relation to undersanding, is that all manifold of intuition should be subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception.” “Only the original unity is objectively valid; the empirical unity of apperception, upon which we are not here dwelling, and which besides is merely derived from the former under given conditionsin concreto, has only subjective validity.” “The manifold given in a sensible intuition is necessarily subject to the original synthetic unity of apperception, because in no other way is the unity of intuition possible.” “This synthetic unity can be no other than the unity of the combination of the manifold of a givenintuition in generalin an original consciousness, in accordance with categories, in so far as the combination is applied to oursensible intuition.” From Kant’s these expositions, we can see, he is repeatedly emphasizing the essential role of “apperception’s synthetic unity” in organizing empirical materials, and more specifically, “transcendental apperception” goes through specific processes such as “synthesis of apperception in intuition”, “synthesis of reproduction in imagination”, “synthesis of recognition in a concept” (these three synthesis all have subjective initiative feature) to integrate empirical materials into understanding concepts, and after many obscure, complex and lengthy discussions, Kant summarizes: “There can be in us no modes of knowledge, no connection or unity of one mode of knowledge with another, without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuitions, and by relation to which representation of objects is alone possible. This pure original unchangeable consciousness I shall nametranscendental apperception.”[18]In Transcendental Analytic, Kant obviously very values “apperception’s synthetic unity”, and calls it as “the supreme principle of all employment of the understanding.” To sum up, Kant thinks “I think” and “the original synthetic unity of apperception” are the foundation of categories and pure concepts of the understanding, because the twelve categories can be changing and also be jumble, and they cannot fundamentally ensure the knowledge’s objectivity in understanding field, while “I think” and “apperception’s transcendental unity” have inherent unity, continuity, coherence and also have objectivity and subjectivity in cognition, and thus, they can ensure knowledge’s universal applicability in understanding field at the essential level. Obviously, Kant’s discussions here are profound, and also involve many valuable epistemological and psychological subjects, and I think many contents in it all deserve subsequent scholars’ further study.
6 About Kant’s scientific mastery.Finally, as one of the basic compositions of Kant’s epistemology, we also want to discuss about Kant’s scientific mastery, people often say that, Kant has good natural science mastery, but we think this common view is questionable, namely, we think Kant’s scientific knowledge just has breadth, but lacks necessary depth. About this, we can compare him with Newton, for example, about the object’s motion and relative motion, Kant writes the following passage: “In this situation, I recognize that motion is a change of place. But I also soon realize that the place of a thing is known by its position, situation, or by its external relationship to other objects around it. Now, I can think of a body in relation to its closest neighboring objects, and, if this relationship does not change, I will say that it is at rest. But as soon as I think of it in relation to a sphere of greater size, it is possible that that body, together with the objects close to it, will change its position in relation to the larger relative space, and from this point of view I shall ascribe motion to it…Assume, for example, that I am on a ship lying moored on the Pregel. Lying on the table in front of me I have a sphere; I observe it in relation to the table, the walls, and other parts of the ship, say that it is at rest. Shortly afterwards, I look from the ship to the shore and notice that the hawser with which it was tied up, has been united and that the ship is slowly drifting downstream; I then say: the sphere is moving, and moving from east to west in accordance with the direction of the river.”[19]Kant’s this passage is interesting, and it includes some physical theory, and also talks about some specific experience and common sense.
While about the object’s motion, Newton also writes a similar passage: “Absolute motion, is the translation of a body from one absolute place into another; and relative motion, the translation from one relative place into another. Thus in a ship under sail, the relative place of a body is that part of the ship which the body possesses; or that part of its cavity which the body fills, and which therefore moves together with the ship; and relative reft, is the continuance of the body in the small part of the ship, or of its cavity.”[20]If it’s just here, then we will think there is no big difference between Kant and Newton, but in the following part ofThe Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, Newton’s expositions are much different from Kant, namely, Newton begins to use many geometric proofs and symbolic arguments to elaborate many physical theorems, which is quite different from Kant’s pure literary narrations; take the motion these two both discuss about as example, Newton puts forward the following theorem: “Quantities, and the ratio’s quantities, which in any finite time converge continually to equality, and before the end of that time approach nearer the one to the other than by any given difference, become ultimately equal.”[21]About this theorem, Newton uses the method of inscribed figures and circumscribed figures to prove it; and in it, he uses complex geometric graphs and the idea of limit, and it is what Kant cannot do. To conclude, through this evident comparison, we can clearly know, the depth of Kant’s scientific mastery is not enough. Furthermore, Kant is not familiar with many then developed mathematical and physical subjects such as calculus and analytic mechanics, and his understanding about many then important scientists like Euler, Lagrange and D’Alembert is also shallow (these scientists’ research is naturally mainly based on symbolic deductions), and from these facts, we can also see, Kant’s scientific mastery is somewhat shallow.
In the above, we roughly examine some central themes in Kant’s epistemology, and Kant’s concrete analyses about them are more detailed and complex than ours, and interested readers can refer to Kant’s related original works and works of Kant experts such as Kemp Smith and Paton, and meanwhile, our expositions here also do not include other important parts such as “Analytic of Principles” and “The Antimony of Pure Reason”, but through these brief discussions, we still can evidently feel the width and profundity of Kant’s epistemology, and thus Kant’s philosophy indeed deserves people’s constant reading and studying; finally, as an appropriate summary, before ending this part, we also want to discuss some basic features of Kant’s epistemology. As we know, Kant’s philosophy is famous for profundity, obscurity and difficultly, and it is not only many ordinary people’s opinion, but also most literary scholars’ view, nd about it, the writer Van Loon once wrote: “I fully know the impact of people like Immanuel Kant and Baruch Spinoza on my mindset. But when I read a few lines ofCritique of Pure Reasonor Spinoza’sEthics, I am in a loss.”[22]I think Van Loon’s opinion also represents most people’s opinion, namely, Kant’s epistemology (and aesthetics, ethics, etc) is very abstruse and obscure, and even some practitioners in philosophy department also feel that Kant’s books are difficult to read. I think there are at least three reasons for this basic phenomenon: firstly, if one people want to understand Kant’s epistemology, he needs to have a somewhat solid foundation in western philosophy, and needs to know much about the philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, Hume, Descartes, Leibniz, etc, and should know these philosophers’ problem consciousness, concepts and theory, etc, because many concepts, problems and ideas in Kant’s epistemology are all built on the theoretical basis of these past philosophers, and correspondingly, if one people lacks systematic and necessary philosophical foundation, it is indeed somewhat difficult to understand Kant’s epistemology. Secondly, in works such asCritique of Pure Reason, Kant himself also creates many new things, like many new terminologies, concepts and methods, and thus, if not familiar with Kant’s problem consciousness and research method, it is also difficult to understand many concepts of the first Critique. Thirdly, on one hand, Kant’s epistemology has the abstruseness and obscurity feature represents the originality and profundity of Kant’s thought, on the other hand, it is also related with the fact that Kant’s thought is not clear and organized enough; it is similar to the situation of mathematician E Cartan, and Cartan’s mathematical works are also famous for difficulty, and on one hand, it demonstrates Cartan’s high originality and profundity in mathematics, on the other hand, it is also related to the fact that his thoughts are not clear and thorough, organized and coherent enough, and obviously, Kant’s situation is similar to Cartan; and therefore, about Kant’s epistemology, I think he actually does not clearly investigate many problems, such as “the original synthetic unity of apperception”, the twelve categories of understanding, etc, namely, his research is actually not complete and thorough enough, and meanwhile, his whole mindset and writing style is also somewhat tortuous and hazy (though on the whole is relatively clear and logical), which also leads to the abstruseness and difficulty of his epistemology. To conclude, considering the above various reasons, reading Kant’s epistemology is indeed not an easy thing, however, as stated above, if we can understand the theoretical system and problem consciousness, thought essence of Kant’s epistemology these two aspects, reading works like the first Critique will also not be too difficult; meanwhile, if we can spend some time in reading and studying Kant’s epistemology, it is also meaningful to enhance our thinking’s speculative ability and improve our comprehensive quality.
(II)The Basic Function of Kant’sEpistemology
On the whole, Kant’s epistemology is very abstruse, dull and abstract, and thereby, in many people’s view, this kind of pure theoretical research seemingly isn’t very useful for real life, and Van Loon once said: “When reading books of Spinoza, Descartes, Kant and Nietzsche in the evening, the only question I ask is what help can this person give to me in my life, enabling me to have the biggest use for myself and my neighbor, and have the least conflict with my conscience.”[23]Facing this kind of questioning, we need to clarify Kant’s epistemology’s basic values for both individual and society.
In general, I think the internal function of Kant’s epistemology mainly embodies in two aspects: firstly, its value for liberal arts research such as economics, politics, art, etc; secondly, its value for scientific fields such as mathematics, physics, chemistry and biology. Firstly, for liberal arts research, there are many scholars who are fond of philosophy, for example, the brilliant economist Marshall likes reading philosophical works such as Kant’sCritique of Pure Reasonand Hegel’sThe Philosophy of History, and I think these books are very helpful for him to develop his speculative ability and improve his economical research’s quality; while for scientific scholars, many scientists like Einstein, Weyl and Heisenberg, etc, also like reading works of philosophical epistemology, and I think it also has many-sided positive enlightenments for their mathematical and physical research. In a word, no matter for social science research or for scientific fields, Kant’s epistemology all includes many valuable concepts, categories of thinking, cognitive framework and thought contents, etc, which can have many-sided and multi-level good enlightenments for many practitioners. Meanwhile, besides the profound enlightenment for social science scholars and scientists, for the numerous ordinary people, philosophical epistemology’s deep value also can have a good positive impact on them and can improve their multi-faceted thoughtful accomplishments. Certainly, besides the influence on scholars and individuals, philosophical epistemology also has profound influence on social institution, basic world view, etc, as we know, different people and countries’ political, economic and social philosophy will often be enormously affected by philosophical epistemology; for example, British and American philosophy is mostly empirical, and people like Locke, Hume, Dewey, James, etc, are all so, while it also shapes the empirical world view of British and American society to a large extent; while German and French philosophical epistemology is mostly rational, such as Descartes, Hegel and Leibniz, and these societies and countries’ world view is mostly constructive and rational. To conclude, many aspects like philosophical epistemology, social institution and scientific view are all interactive, and there also exist extensive and profound interactions between them.
Indeed, on the surface many works of philosophical epistemology have no direct function for real life, but our social functioning is very complicated, though philosophical epistemology cannot directly solve some concrete life experience issues such as family affairs and job assignments, but when we are facing family problems such as taking care of family member, shopping for food and cooking, and daily living, at other places, many mathematicians, physicists, chemists and liberal art scholars are working hard to innovate, and are making some important scientific and technological discoveries, while these scientists and social science scholars’ work results create more job positions and also guarantee the economy’s healthy development, and further improve many families’ economic condition and solve many practical living issues. To sum up, when we consider the internal value of philosophical epistemology, we should keep a larger perspective, and consider these problems from the social totality perspective; while when we consider the philosophical epistemology’s function from this perspective, I think we can have relatively reasonable opinions about such kind of problem.
Certainly, on the other hand, as we repeated say in the above part (I), the impact of Kant’s epistemology on mathematics and physics is just indirect and limited, more generally, the impact of many philosophers’ epistemological views on scientific research such as mathematics, physics and chemistry is also just methodological and indirect, and thus is relatively limited. The deeper reaso for this is, modern mathematics and physics’ research is much more complex and difficult than Kant’s epistemology (like the space and time part), and many epistemological views (such as Kuhn’s “paradigm” theory) all oversimplify the practical scientific research, and take the abstract algebra in mathematics as example, its group theory, ring theory, field theory and Galois theory are all very complex, deep and systematic, and they all use a great many various types of symbols, concepts, techniques and tools, and these theories’ concrete contents are difficult to understand for philosophers who do not know modern science; generally speaking, practical scientific research is much more difficult and detailed than philosophical epistemology’s many views, and these scientific investigations also cost many scientists’ a lot of thinking and hardworking. To conclude, philosophical epistemology has certain value for scientific research, but also cannot be overly exaggerated, which I think is also a basic fact we need to consider when evaluating philosophical epistemology’s function.
(III)The Developing Features of Philosophy
Before ending this paper, we also want to discuss about the overall developing features of philosophy. Firstly, we want to analyze philosophy’s developing trend from the perspective of philosophical works. If we compare Popper’sConjectures and Refutations(1963) or Rorty’sPhilosophy and the Mirror of Nature(1979) with Locke’sAn Essay Concerning Human Understanding(1690), Kant’sCritique of Pure Reason(1781) or Hegel’sLogic(1817), we can feel that it is actually a big question about how much progress the philosophical epistemology achieves over the past 200 years. Firstly, as for Kant’s epistemology, on one hand, Popper’s and Rorty’s understandings about Kantian philosophy merely concentrate in a small part, including space and time, sensibility and understanding, while they are not familiar with other important problems such as the pure concepts of the understanding, self-consciousness, the original synthetic unity of apperception, the antimony of pure reason, etc; on the other hand, as elaborated in part (I), even about space and time, sensibility and understanding these basic themes, these philosophers’ understandings are also more superficial than Kant; in summary, in breadth and depth these two basic aspects, the above philosophers’ perceptions about Kant’s epistemology all have a certain degree of retrogression. Popper and Rorty are both brilliant philosophers, and they are still so, and most ordinary scholars’ mastery about Kantian philosophy is naturally worse. Secondly, as for philosophers such as Locke, Descartes, Leibniz, Hegel, etc, Popper and Rorty’s many concrete perceptions are also worse than the thought of Locke, Descartes, Leibniz and Hegel. To conclude, for every generation of philosopher, they will mostly read and study works of Aristotle, Locke, Descartes, Kant and Hegel, but compared with Kant and Locke, their many related thoughts become more superficial; in general, many 20th-century philosophical scholars’ understandings about these important philosophers often have a simplistic and superficial basic tendency, which I think is an important developing feature of philosophy.
Take the specific philosophers as another example, due to philosophy’s width and complexity, and therefore, it leads to that many philosophers actually do not quite know some philosophical branches and philosophers, for example, Dewey and Heidegger just pay little attention to contemporary Wittgenstein’s language philosophy, while Dewey and Ayer are also not familiar with contemporary Husserl and Heidegger’s phenomenology and existentialism. It is somewhat similar to what happens in economics and politics. Firstly, as for economics, famous economist Hayek actually does not quite know Ricardo, Keynes and Knight’s ideas and assertions (because he is relatively pedantic and theoretical, while these economists pay more attention to practice), while some other economists, such as Mendel and Samuelson who are familiar with economic models, actually do not quite know some theoretical economists such as Mill, Smith and Schumpeter. Take politics as another example, about some political philosophy subjects such as public reason, communicative behavior, justice and goodness which Rawls, Nozick, Habermas, Charles Taylor and Dworkin intensely debate, political scientists like Moore, Dahl, Huntington and Lijphart rarely care about, while Charles Taylor and Dworkin actually also do not quite understand some political science subjects like pluralistic democracy and democratization process these political scientists care about, namely, the intersection of these two groups of political scientists is actually also small. To sum up, for humanity and social sciences such as economics, politics, philosophy and sociology, a basic phenomenon which often happens is, many scholars actually are not very familiar with other scholars’ important works; I think the reason is due to these fields’ broadness and profundity, because these fields are all broad and abstruse, while every scholar’s energy is somewhat limited, which therefore easily leads to that some scholars do not quite know certain subjects, and also easily leads to that one scholar does not quite know another scholar’s ideas, claims and knowledge background, etc. In a word, this basic phenomenon in philosophy is also worth our attention.
Considering various kinds of situations, I think there are three basic developing trends in philosophy: progress, originality, staying still and retrogression; for example, if reading works of William James, likePragmatism(1907), we will see, there are many new fundamental ideas in it, and some are consistent in basic ideas, but with some new empirical details, while some have a relatively big retrogression, and these three kinds of various facts often mingle together. Meanwhile, due to philosophy’s many branches and many thought orientations (language philosophy, structuralism, existentialism, logical positivism, etc) often mingle and interweave together, which results in a certain degree of disturbance of philosophical research, and thereby, people seemingly can’t clearly see philosophy’s holistic shape and developing feature. Broadly speaking, I think in many basic philosophical problems, the views of many generations of philosophers actually do no change too much, such as experience and reason, existence, time and space, analytical proposition and synthetic proposition, truth, fact and value, etc, and various philosophers’ discussions about these philosophical themes often repeat a lot; I think one important reason for that philosophy has a bad reputation among many scholars is philosophers often repeat discussing many problems (which is quite different with mathematics and physics, and in mathematics and physics, people hardly repeat the previous works). Certainly, for philosophical research, a healthy developing tendency is the expansion of research fields, for example, the language philosophy which Wittgenstein, Quine, Austin systematically study had not been universally and highly valued in the 18th-century philosophical world (though Locke (refer to Volume III ofAn Essay Concerning Human Understanding) and Leibniz (refer to Volume III ofNew Essays on Human Understanding) also value the language problem), namely, separating language philosophy to independently study is indeed one big contribution of 20th-century philosophical epistemology. In conclusion, I think, as a wide-ranging academic field, some macroscopic problems such as philosophy’s research scope, developing features, research methods, basic values are all some interesting and important problems.
[1]Critique of Pure Reason, “Transcendental Aesthetic”, Section 1, pp. 65, 66 A 19, 20, B 33, 34, Macmillan Co., Limited, 1929.
[2]Nature and the Greeks and Science and Humanism, Chapter II, “The Competition, Reasons v. Senses”, p. 26, Cambridge University Press, 2014.
[3]See the above book, p. 30.
[4]See the above book, p. 24.
[5]Conjectures and Refutations, Chapter VII, Section 5, pp. 180, 181, Basic Books, 1962.
[6]Philosophical Investigations, Section 37, p. 18, Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1958.
[7]Chu Hsi’s Dialogue, Volume I, the first part of “Reason and Qi”, p. 1, China Publishing House, 1986.
[8]Critique of Pure Reason, “Transcendental Aesthetic”, Part I, Section I, “Space”, pp. 71, 72, A26-28, B42-44.
[9]See the above book, Part I, Section II, “Time”, p. 77, A 33, B 50.
[10]See the above quoted bookConjectures and Refutations, p. 179.In the seventh chapter of this book, Popper makes somewhat systematic expositions about Kantian philosophy, and discusses many aspects of Kantian philosophy, which has certain reference value for the study of Kant’s epistemology.
[11]Science and Hypothesis, Chapter V, pp. 87, 88, The Walter Scott Publishing Co., LTD, 1905.
[12]Mathematics and Science: Last Essays, Chapter III, p. 30, Commercial Press, 1995.
[13]Critique of Pure Reason, “Introduction”, Section V-VII, pp. 52-58, B 14-25.
[14]See the above book, Part I, Section II, “Time”, p. 80, A 39, B 56.
[15]Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Chapter III, Section 3, “Kant’s confusion of predication with synthesis”, pp. 153, 154, Princeton University Press, 1979.
[16]Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, Part I, Chapter I, Section 4, “The axiomatic method”, pp. 18-23, Princeton University Press, 1949.
[17]Critique of Pure Reason, “Transcendental Logic”, Section 10-14, pp. 112-126, A 79-94, B105-127.
[18]See the above book, “Transcendental Analytic”, Section 16-27, A 95-129, B 132-169.
[19]The Works of Immanuel Kant: Natural Sciences, “A New Doctrine of Motion and Rest” (1758), pp. 400, 401, Cambridge University Press, 2012.
[20]The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, “Definition” part, “Scholium”.
[21]See the above book, Book I, “Of the Motion of Bodies”, Section I, Lemma I.
[22]On Human, “Descartes”, p. 234, Hainan Press, 2000.
[23]See the above book, pp. 236, 237. |
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